In State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 2008 Ohio 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, ("Colon I"), the Supreme Court of Ohio held: "when an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment." Id. at syllabus. In Colon I, the defendant had been charged with robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). His indictment stated that defendant "in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in Section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense upon the victim, the defendant did inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on the victim." Id. at P2. The Colon I court found that the indictment failed to contain a mens rea for the actus reus element stated in subsection (2), i.e., "inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another." The court reasoned that because R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) does not specify a particular degree of culpability for the act of "inflicting, attempting, to inflict, or threatening to inflict physical harm" and because the statute does not plainly indicate that strict liability is the mental standard, the catch-all culpable mental state of "recklessness" applied. The court concluded that because the mens rea "recklessness" was missing from the indictment, the indictment was defective because it failed to charge an essential element of the offense. Id. at P19. The court also concluded that the defective indictment resulted in a lack of notice to the defendant of the mens rea required to commit the offense, and that, because the defect clearly permeated the entire criminal proceeding, the defect resulted in structural error. Id. at P32. The Colon I court then reversed the conviction. The Ohio Supreme Court held that an indictment for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) omitted an essential element of the crime by failing to charge the "recklessness" mens rea element associated with inflicting, attempting to inflict, or threatening to inflict physical harm in the course of a theft offense. The Supreme Court stated that the omission of the reckless mental element from the indictment resulted in the State failing to charge an offense, and that failure constituted "structural error" which required reversal. Id. at syllabus. On reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that Colon I was prospective, and "applies only to those cases pending on the date Colon I was announced." State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St.3d 204, 2008 Ohio 3749, at P5, 893 N.E.2d 169 ("Colon II"). The Colon II court also stated that "the facts that led to our opinion in Colon I are unique," noting that the defective indictment was not the only error that had occurred, but that the defective indictment resulted in several other violations of the defendant's rights. Id. at P6. Specifically, the court noted the following: (1) there was no evidence to show that the defendant had notice that recklessness was an element of the crime of robbery; (2) there was no evidence that the state argued that the defendant's conduct was reckless; (3) the trial court did not include recklessness as an element of the crime when it instructed the jury; (4) in closing argument, the prosecuting attorney treated robbery as a strict-liability offense. Id. at P6. The Colon II court went on to conclude that the structural-error analysis for defective indictments is "appropriate only in rare cases in which multiple errors at trial follow the defective indictment." Id. at P8. The court then stated, "Seldom will a defective indictment have this effect, and therefore, in most defective indictment cases, the court may analyze the error pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B) plain error. Consistent with our discussion herein, we emphasize that the syllabus in Colon I is confined to the facts in that case." Id. at P8. In State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 2008 Ohio 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a defendant convicted for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) could raise for the first time on appeal the issue of the indictment being defective for failing to charge the requisite mens rea of recklessness. Colon at P1, 19. The court concluded that structural error, and not plain error, applied because the defect in the indictment led to significant errors throughout the defendant's trial. Colon at P23. The court reversed the defendant's conviction upon finding structural error in the defendant's indictment. Id. at P32, 45. The court recognized that the existence of " 'structural error mandates a finding of "per se prejudice." Id. at P20. In State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 2008 Ohio 1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, the court found that an indictment for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) was defective where it omitted the mens rea element of recklessness, which was an essential element of the crime. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d at P29-30. The court proceeded to apply a structural-error analysis and found that the defect clearly permeated the defendant's entire criminal proceeding where there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had notice that the state was required to prove that he had been reckless in order to convict him of the offense of robbery. Id. at P32. The court specifically recognized that at trial the state did not argue the defendant's conduct was reckless, the state treated robbery as a strict- liability offense in closing argument, and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the required mens rea for the offense. Id.