In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 1998 Ohio 291, 700 N.E.2d 570, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered, among other things, whether former R.C. Chapter 2950 violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The Court first found that "the General Assembly's purpose behind R.C. Chapter 2950 was to promote public safety and bolster the public's confidence in Ohio's criminal and mental health systems." Cook at 417. "Thus, former R.C. Chapter 2950, on its face, clearly was not punitive because it sought to 'protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state,' which is a 'paramount governmental interest.' R.C. 2950.02(B) and (A)(2)." Cook at 417. The Supreme Court next focused on whether the effect of former R.C. Chapter 2950 was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the General Assembly's stated intention. The Court noted that the inconvenience of registration was a de minimus administrative requirement. Cook at 418. And although the dissemination of registration information could have a detrimental effect on an offender, "whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the 'sting of punishment.'" Id. Accordingly, former R.C. Chapter 2950 imposed no new affirmative disability or restraint. Cook at 418. The Court also observed that registration requirements had "long been a valid regulatory technique with a remedial purpose," and "the importance of public access prevailed over the detrimental effect that the release of derogatory information may have on a defendant." Id. at 418-419. Furthermore, there was no scienter requirement because failing to register, by itself, was sufficient to trigger criminal punishment under the statute. Id. at 419-420. When discussing whether former R.C. Chapter 2950 promoted the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, the Court concluded that the registration and notification requirements did not seek vengeance, but instead had a "remedial purpose of collecting and disseminating information to relevant persons to protect the public from registrants who may reoffend." Cook at 420. With respect to deterrence, the Court found that the registration and notification requirements, by themselves, did not act as deterrents, and even if there was some deterrent effect, the effect was remedial in nature and not punitive. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court stated in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 411, 700 N.E.2d 570, "A statute is 'substantive' if it impairs or takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations or liabilities as to a past transaction, or creates a new right. Conversely, remedial laws are those affecting only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right. A purely remedial statute does not violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, even if applied retroactively. Further, while we have recognized the occasional substantive effect, we have found that it is generally true that laws that relate to procedures are ordinarily remedial in nature." The defendant in Cook challenged the 1997 version of R.C. Chapter 2950 that had increased the frequency and duration of the previous registration requirements for sex offenders and had expanded the number of sex-offender classifications from one to three. The Cook court noted that "except with regard to constitutional protections against ex post facto laws felons have no reasonable right to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of legislation." The court held that the registration and address-verification requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 were de minimis procedural requirements that were necessary to achieve the goals of protecting the public from sexual offenders, and that they did not violate the constitutional ban on retroactive laws. In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998 Ohio 291, 700 N.E.2d 570, the court concluded that the registration and notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 did not "seek retribution." Rather, the provisions were remedial because they sought to protect the public from sex offenders who might reoffend. The Cook court held that former R.C. Chapter 2950 did not have a deterrent effect because sex offenders were not "deterred even by the threat of incarceration." Further, "deterrence alone is insufficient to make a statute punitive." In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404, 418-20, 1998 Ohio 291, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Williams, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 528. The Supreme Court reasoned that that version of Chapter 2950 did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because, in Cook, the Supreme Court had held the Chapter was not "criminal" and the registration and notification provisions did not involve "punishment." Williams, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 528. In Cook, the Supreme Court considered that Chapter 2950 required dissemination of the offenders' registration information to certain persons. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d at 418-20. The Court acknowledged the fact that dissemination of that information "could have a detrimental effect on offenders, causing them to be ostracized and subjecting them to embarrassment or harassment." Id. at 418. The Court in Cook also noted that, despite the detrimental effect of the notification procedures for the registrants, "the sting of public censure does not convert a remedial statute into a punitive one." Id. at 423. In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998 Ohio 291, 700 N.E.2d 570, the Supreme Court stated that "the issue of whether R.C. 2950.09 may be constitutionally applied retrospectively does not arise unless there has been a prior determination that the General Assembly specified that the statute so apply. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph one of the syllabus. We find that the General Assembly so specified." Cook, supra, at 410. In so determining, the Cook court found that R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) applied to sex offenders who were convicted and sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute and who were still imprisoned when the statute became effective. Second, the registration and verification requirements were also applicable to certain sex offenders whose crimes occurred before the effective date. See, e.g., R.C. 2950.04(A). Third, the community notification provisions applied regardless of when the offense was committed. See, e.g., former R.C. 2950.11(A). Finally, failure to comply with the registration and verification requirements constituted a crime regardless of when the underlying offense was committed. See former R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) and 2950.99. Consequently, the Cook court found "a clearly expressed legislative intent that R.C. Chapter 2950 be applied retrospectively."