In State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008 Ohio 2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "Ohio's burglary statutes proscribe a single crime that may be carried out in more than one manner or method. The language indicates that the emphasis is on the fact that the defendant had an intent to commit a felony and it does not matter which felony formed the basis of that intent. There are different means of accomplishing this crime, but the different ways do not create a separate and distinct offense." Id. at P63. Likewise, Ohio's kidnapping statutes proscribe various means of accomplishing the crime. See, also, State v. Gilbert, Cuyahoga App. No. 90615, 2009 Ohio 463, P33, citing State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005 Ohio 6046, 837 N.E.2d 315 ("neither the kidnapping nor the aggravated-robbery instructions were improper, because the alternatives were given to the jury disjunctively.") In Gardner, the court reasoned as follows: "Although Crim.R. 31(A) requires juror unanimity on each element of the crime, jurors need not agree to a single way by which an element is satisfied. Richardson v. United States (1999), 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985. Applying the federal counterpart of Crim.R. 31(A), the Richardson court stated that a 'jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.' The Court acknowledged that "different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly, there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.'" Id. at PP 38-39, quoting Schad v. Arizona (1991), 501 U. S. 624, at 631-632, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555, quoting McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), 494 U. S. 433, 449, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369.