In State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 6 Ohio B. 526, 453 N.E.2d 716, the accused was indicted on a drug trafficking charge, but the indictment did not identify the controlled substance involved. The Headley Court wrote that the essence of the constitutional guarantee articulated in Wozniak is "further manifested in Crim.R. 7(D)," which limits the court's power to amend an indictment. Id. at 479, 453 N.E.2d 716. The Headley Court concluded that the indictment in that case could not be amended because the type of controlled substance involved was an essential element of the crime and the amendment, "would change the very identity of the offense charged." Id., 453 N.E.2d 716. The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of how the failure to specify the name of the controlled substance in an indictment affected the validity of the indictment. In that case, the indictment did not name the drug at all, but simply asserted the involvement of "a controlled substance." The state was allowed to later amend the indictment to add the language "to wit: cocaine." The court noted that R.C. 2925.03 outlaws trafficking in a variety of different drugs, and that the "severity of the offense is dependent upon the type of drug involved." Therefore, "R.C. 2925.03 sets forth more than one criminal offense with the identity of each being determined by the type of controlled substance involved. As such, the type of controlled substance involved constitutes an essential element of the crime which must be included in the indictment." Upon motion, the trial court amended an indictment to specify the type of controlled substance involved in a drug- trafficking charge, when the original indictment had not identified it. Although the issue was whether the original indictment was fatally flawed (not whether the amendment was proper), the Supreme Court analyzed the omission and subsequent amendment under Crim.R. 7(D). The court observed "the severity of the offense is dependent upon the type of drug involved," and in particular, that possession of certain controlled substances merits a charge of aggravated trafficking, while possession of others merits a charge of trafficking in drugs, a lesser offense. Id. at 479. Pursuant to this analysis, the Court concluded that an amendment to specify the type of drugs involved was improper because changing the type of drug involved would "change the very identity of the offense charged." Id.