In State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004 Ohio 732, 803 N.E.2d 770, Lozier was convicted of trafficking in L.S.D. in the vicinity of a school which enhanced the penalty under R.C. 2925.03(C). Under R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b), "if the offense was committed in the vicinity of a school or in the vicinity of a juvenile, trafficking in L.S.D. is a felony of the fourth degree." Lozier argued that he did not know he was in the vicinity of a school. However, the trial court ruled that whether Lozier knew he was selling drugs in the vicinity of a school was irrelevant because the specification for trafficking within the vicinity of a school was written in terms of strict liability. The Ohio Supreme Court held that while strict liability applied to trafficking in L.S.D. in the vicinity of a juvenile, recklessness applied to L.S.D. trafficking in the vicinity of a school under R.C. 2901.21(B). Id. at P40 and 45. The supreme court reasoned that: "Here, we are dealing with a pair of discrete clauses separated by 'or' in R.C. 2925.03(C)(5)(b). Standing alone, 'in the vicinity of a school or in the vicinity of a juvenile' does not indicate any required degree of mental culpability. However, each clause is separately defined in the chapter's definitional section. 'In the vicinity of a juvenile,' as defined in R.C. 2925.01(BB), employs strict liability terms. By contrast, the definition of 'in the vicinity of a school,' contained in R.C. 2925.01(P), lacks the express strict liability language of R.C. 2925.01(BB). We find that the language employed by the General Assembly in the R.C. 2925.01(P) and 2925.01(BB) definitions establishes differing levels of culpability for offenses committed 'in the vicinity of a juvenile' and 'in the vicinity of a school,' plainly indicating that the General Assembly's purpose was to impose strict liability for acts committed 'in the vicinity of a juvenile' but not for acts committed 'in the vicinity of a school.'" Id. at P32, 34, 37, and 40.