In State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 375, 1999 Ohio 112, 715 N.E.2d 172, the defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). The trial court later amended the indictment to robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1). At trial, the defendant proposed a jury instruction that, before the jury could find him guilty of robbery, they must find that he acted recklessly in having a deadly weapon on or about his person. Id. at 376. The trial court declined to give the proposed jury instruction, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that "recklessly" was the required mental state for the deadly weapon element of robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(1). The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument and affirmed, but entered an order certifying a conflict with judgments of other courts of appeals. In Wharf, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "the General Assembly intended that a theft offense, committed while an offender was in possession or control of a deadly weapon, is robbery and no intent beyond that required for the theft offense must be proven." Id. at 377. Further, the court held that "by employing language making mere possession or control of a deadly weapon, as opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation, it is clear to us that the General Assembly intended that R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) be a strict liability offense." Id. at 378. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) is a strict liability offense and that the deadly weapon element does not require the mens rea of recklessness. The Court that "it is not necessary to prove a specific mental state regarding the deadly weapon element of the offense of robbery" as charged in R.C. 2911.02(A)(1). The robbery statute provided that "no person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control." The supreme court in Wharf noted that, unlike the aggravated-robbery statute (at issue in Lester and here), "no use, display, or brandishing of a weapon, or intent to do any of the aforementioned acts, is necessary according to the plain language of the robbery statute. Had the legislature so intended, it certainly could have required a level of conduct more severe than it did in order to show a violation of the statute. Thus, by employing language making mere possession or control of a deadly weapon, as opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation, it is clear to us that the General Assembly intended that R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) be a strict liability offense."