Steinmetz v. Latva

In Steinmetz v. Latva, 6th Dist. No. E-02-025, 2003 Ohio 3455, Gerken Paving Company ("Gerken") was performing construction for the Ohio Department of Transportation on State Route 2. Id., P 2. The plaintiffs, Kristen and Paul Steinmetz and their two small children, who were in the rear seat of their automobile, were stopped behind backed-up traffic approximately one mile from the construction site. Id. George Latva approached the end of the backed-up traffic line, did not stop his motor vehicle and crashed into the rear of the Steinmetz automobile, killing the two children and injuring their parents. Id. The parents and their insurance company sued Gerken, Latva, and the civil engineering firm that drew up the maintenance plan. Id., P 3. Prior to trial, the claim against Latva was settled. Id. at fn. 1. The Steinmetz's insurance company also settled their insured's claim before trial. Id. Following trial, a jury entered an award of $ 2.5 million against Gerken. Id. Gerken appealed the judgment, asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict because there was no evidence of proximate cause offered at trial. Id., P 6. Appellee, the insurance company, presented the testimony of an expert witness at trial to demonstrate how the signage used by Gerken, the monitoring of that signage, and the deficient general monitoring of the construction site was the proximate cause of the accident. Id., P 22. The Court determined that the expert's testimony was "not competent as to proximate cause." Id., P 28. In doing so the Court found: "While he [the expert] testified that deficient engineering in a construction zone causes a 'high probability' that a driver's response will be affected, he did not testify specifically that the engineering work in this case affected Latva's response. Further, his general testimony that the engineering work was 'a causal factor' in the accident was not given with any probability. He testified that the engineering work was a causal factor but not the only causal factor. Such testimony would not permit a trier of fact to find that there was more than a 50 percent likelihood that the engineering work caused the accident. Furthermore, his testimony attempting to link the signage to the accident was pure conjecture: Since Latva drove up to the point of impact without incident, he must have been confused by the signs and his confusion must have caused him to collide into the Steinmetz vehicle. Such conjecture is inadmissible to establish proximate cause." Id.