Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp

In Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 1999 Ohio 119, 715 N.E.2d 546, the supreme court held that 'there are certain things that an expert, by reason of his expertise, knows. When providing background information, and not opining as to causation, we cannot expect an expert to footnote every statement with a recitation of his direct observation of the phenomenon, or a bibliography explaining how he knows his statement to be true. A distinction can be made between background information and an opinion about causation. When testifying as to broad patterns rather than specific opinions, the same level of foundation is not required.' Id. at 437-438. See, also, State v. Jenkins, Miami App. No. 2000-CA-59, 2002 Ohio 3651 (holding that expert testimony that physical evidence of child sexual abuse was present in only 15 percent of cases assisted the jury in determining whether abuse had occurred and did not run afoul of Evid.R. 703). In our view, Reed's testimony about the likelihood that Smith's cancer had spread to her lymph nodes in March 1995, which incorporated his involvement with the NSABP studies and the data gathered from those studies, did not violate Evid.R. 703 by incorporating hearsay testimony." Id. at P21-22.