In Chavez (Token) v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 738 A.2d 77, 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (Chavez), allocatur den., 563 Pa. 704, 761 A.2d 551 (2000), the employer made unilateral changes to the employee health plan and the employee handbook during the course of negotiations with the claimants' labor union. Id. at 79. The employer then conditioned continued employment on acceptance of the new health plan and new handbook. As a result, the union commenced a work stoppage. Id. The Court was asked to address the question of whether the strike/lockout analysis under Section 402(d) of the Law applied to a work stoppage initiated by workers represented by a labor union, but who had no existing or recently expired collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Id. at 80. Section 402(d) of the Law provides: An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week- (d) In which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed: Provided, That this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (1) he is not participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (2) he is not a member of an organization which is participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (3) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in, or directly interested in, the dispute. 43 P.S. 802(d). Claimants argued that the strike/lockout analysis should apply due to the fact that the NLRA obligates employers to bargain in good faith over any changes to wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment--otherwise known as mandatory subjects of bargaining--once workers are represented by a certified union. Id. Rejecting the claimants' position, this Court stated: Claimants' reliance on the NLRA is misplaced. The NLRA is designed to regulate collective bargaining, whereas the principal objective of the Law is to alleviate economic distress in individual cases where employees become unemployed through no fault of their own. Accordingly, the NLRA does not provide a persuasive model for the Court's interpretation of the Law. Moreover, if the Court were to adopt petitioner's suggestion that the strike/lockout analysis be applied to the status quo mandated by the NLRA when federal law requires bargaining in good faith, then the Court would needlessly entangle this state's unemployment compensation jurisprudence with the complex body of federal law surrounding the NLRA. Chavez, 738 A.2d at 81.