In Commonwealth v. Haag, 603 Pa. 46, 981 A.2d 902 (2009), the licensee was arrested at 11:40 p.m. and subsequently charged with DUI under 75 Pa. C.S. 3802(c) (highest rate of alcohol). At approximately 1:00 a.m., after being released to the custody of his wife, the police again spotted licensee driving. The police arrested him again and charged him with a second DUI offense under 75 Pa. C.S. 3802(b) (high rate of alcohol). Following a bench trial, the court found licensee guilty of two separate DUI violations. The court sentenced licensee to a minimum of 72 hours in prison for the 11:40 p.m. offense and a minimum of 30 days in prison for the 1:00 a.m. offense. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined a plain interpretation of the language in 75 Pa. C.S. 3806 indicates the specific rule in Section 3806(b) overrides the general rule in Section 3806(a). In Haag, the Court explained: Under subsection (a), the "general rule," a "prior offense" is one for which conviction has occurred "before sentencing on the present" violation in question. 75 Pa. C.S. 3806(a). By significant and ultimately dispositive contrast, under the more specific subsection (b), a "prior offense" is one for which conviction has occurred "within ten years before the present Section 3802 or other violation occurred." 75 Pa. C.S. 3806(b).... Section 3806(a) expressly yields to Section 3806(b) when the latter is applicable: "Except as set forth in subsection (b) ...." Thus, as in the present case, for purposes of imposing sentence under Section 3804, when a sentencing court is required to determine whether there has been a "prior Section 3802 offense" within ten years of another Section 3802 offense, the court must apply Section 3806(b). Thus, for purposes of applying the recidivist sentencing provisions of the DUI statute, when presented with two or more Section 3802 DUI violations, a sentencing court must first ascertain whether conviction on the first violation occurred before the offender committed the subsequent offense. If no conviction on that previous violation had occurred by the time the offender committed the subsequent violation, pursuant to Section 3806(b), the offender cannot be sentenced as a recidivist on the subsequent violation. To the extent their holdings are contrary, we specifically disapprove of Misner, Neives and Stafford, supra. 981 A.2d at 905-07. Based on its analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.