In Commonwealth v. LeBar, 2004 PA Super 403, 860 A.2d 1105 (Pa. Super. 2004), an inmate argued that the Department was precluded from deducting $ 466.00 in court costs from his inmate account because the sentencing court order did not impose court costs. Our superior court agreed. However, our superior court noted that, by statute, $ 60.00 in costs must be imposed upon a person convicted of a crime for the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. Thus, our superior court held that the Department could deduct $ 60.00 from the inmate's account without a court order. The inmate sought review of a decision of a sentencing court that had denied the inmate's motion to compel the county clerk of court, and the Department, to return monies deducted in violation of Section 9728 of the Sentencing Code from the inmate's monthly income to cover court costs. In its analysis of Act 84, Superior Court first addressed the issue of the assessment of discretionary, court-ordered monies: We need look no further than the language of Act 84, which provides the "procedural mechanism for the collection of court costs and fines." Harding v. Stickman, 823 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). The Act vests authority in DOC to collect on court-assessed costs, fines, and restitution. See 42 Pa.C.S. 9728(b)(5). What, on its plain language, Act 84 most assuredly does not do, is vest in the clerks of courts of the counties of this Commonwealth the fundamentally judicial authority to assess costs in the first instance against parties where costs have not been explicitly provided for in that party's sentencing order. Indeed, the section permitting DOC to collect court-ordered costs could not be more clear on this point: "The county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or the Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation." 42 Pa.C.S. 9728(b)(5); see Boyd v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 831 A.2d 779, 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (The Department of Corrections is authorized to make monetary deductions from an inmate's personal account for the purposes of collecting restitution, as well as fines and costs, which were imposed by the sentencing court ...."); See also Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa. Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783, 794-95 (1996) (discussing generally the ways in which a court order sentencing a party to costs may be followed within thirty days by a court order setting such costs, which in turn would, by court order, "give the sentencing cost substance and enforcement perimeters to allow the collection agent for the court to act timely"). . . . The only money DOC might collect from LeBar's personal inmate account under 9728 must be a "court-ordered obligation"-something strikingly absent . . . from the original sentencing order. . .LeBar, 860 A.2d at 1109-1110. However, continuing its analysis, Superior Court differentiated between costs which the sentencing court has discretion to expressly order paid, or to waive, and statutorily mandated, or non-waivable, costs. Superior Court stated further: This does not end our inquiry, however; the Commonwealth has directed our attention to a statute the trial court might have referred to when it summarily described court costs as "statutory in nature." Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts that 18 P.S. 11.1101 authorizes all of the costs DOC collected from LeBar in this case. Relevantly, that section provides as follows: 11.1101. Costs (a) Imposition. (1) A person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is convicted of a crime shall, in addition to costs imposed under 42 Pa.C.S. 3571(c) (relating to Commonwealth portion of fines, etc.), pay costs of at least $ 60 and may be sentenced to pay additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum monetary penalty for the offense committed. (c) Payment. This cost shall be imposed notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary. (e) Court order. No court order shall be necessary in order for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. Costs under this section must be paid in order for the defendant to be eligible for probation, parole or accelerated rehabilitative disposition. 18 P.S. 11.1101. Our research discloses no cases interpreting this statutory provision, thus we must rely on the statute's plain language to determine whether and how it applies to LeBar's case. See 1 Pa.C.S. 1903(a) ("Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage ...."). The Commonwealth would have us rule that 11.1101(a) validates all of the fines charged to LeBar, and that 11.1101(e) authorizes the method of collection implemented in this case notwithstanding the lack of a court order imposing those costs. Section 11.1101 unequivocally imposes a $ 60 fee on LeBar, which we must uphold. To that extent, then, the costs imposed were indeed "statutory in nature," and to that extent only we affirm the trial court's order sustaining DOC's collection of fees from LeBar. With regard to the balance of monies collected from LeBar, however, we note that 11.1101(a)(1) contains language susceptible to the same analysis we applied to 42 Pa.C.S. 9728. As in that section, 11.1101 provides that a person who pleads guilty "shall ... pay costs of at least $ 60 and may be sentenced to pay additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum monetary penalty for the offense committed." 18 P.S. 11.1101(a)(1). As in 9728, the statute recognizes that the sentencing court may in its discretion impose costs up to the relevant statutory maximum; beyond the mandatory $ 60 assessment, however, 11.1101 is not self-executing but rather requires a "sentence" in the same way that 9728 requires a court order. Based on our analysis above, and our brief discussion to follow, we find that the trial court neither sentenced nor validly ordered imposition of any costs, fees, or restitution. Consequently LeBar is responsible only for the mandatory $ 60 assessment provided in 18 P.S. 11.1101. Thus, we have no choice but to enforce the original sentencing order, which imposed neither costs nor fines on LeBar. Of course, consistent with the above discussion, we find no impropriety in the collection of $ 60 from LeBar; as to the difference between this amount and the $ 466 actually collected, however, we find that DOC's collection was erroneous and must be remedied. LeBar, 860 A.2d at 1110 -1112. In LeBar, our Superior Court directed the trial court therein to "see to the restitution" to the inmate's account of the monies "improperly collected and ostensibly forwarded" to the trial court in that matter. LeBar, 860 A.2d at 1112.