In Commonwealth v. Halye, 719 A.2d 763 (Pa. Super. 1998), the Court held that the provisions of Megan's Law relating to sexually violent predators violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution because such provisions required offenders of specified sexually violent crimes to rebut a presumption that they were not sexually violent predators and relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proof. Halye, 719 A.2d at 769. See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 285, 733 A.2d 593, 608 (Pa. 1999) (concluding sexually violent predator provisions of Megan's Law violate procedural due process guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution). Megan's Law prescribed distinct registration and notification provisions for those classified as sex offenders as well as for those classified as sexually violent predators. See 42 Pa.C.S. 9793, 9795-9798. Our decision in Halye did not affect the provisions of Megan's Law that require sex offenders to register. Rather, we struck as unconstitutional only sections of Megan's Law that referred to the designation "sexually violent predators." Halye, 719 A.2d at 769. The registration of sex offenders mandated by 42 Pa.C.S. 9793 remains good law. See Williams, 733 A.2d at 596 n.6; Halye, 719 A.2d at 766; Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. 1998) (concluding registration provisions are not a bill of attainder, do not impermissibly invade registrant's privacy rights, and do not violate registrant's substantive or procedural due process rights).