In Drabic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 588 Pa. 670, 906 A.2d 1153 (2006), the licensee, Drabic, pled guilty to and was convicted of fourteen offenses, eleven of which were Vehicle Code violations. All fourteen offenses arose from a single motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 27, 2003. As a consequence of Drabic's multiple convictions, the Department imposed multiple suspensions of Drabic's operating privileges under 75 Pa. C.S. 1532, and Drabic appealed. The trial court concluded that the conviction for DUI and the conviction for aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence merged because all the elements of DUI had to be proven in order to establish the latter violation. Using the same analysis, it concluded that the conviction for reckless driving merged into the conviction for homicide by vehicle. The Court affirmed in part, modifying the order to reinstate the suspension for Drabic's reckless driving conviction. Granting the Department's appeal, the Supreme Court framed the legal issue as whether collateral civil consequences of criminal acts, in this instance, suspensions of operating privileges..., should be merged to accord with the merger of the underlying criminal convictions from which the collateral civil consequences flow. Drabic, 588 Pa. at 672, 906 A.2d at 1154. The Supreme Court held that Drabic's conviction for aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence merged into his conviction for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence. As a result, Drabic was subject to a three-year suspension of his license as a result of his conviction for vehicular homicide. The conviction for aggravated assault by vehicle did not extend this suspension because this second criminal conviction had merged into the vehicular homicide conviction. Notably, the Supreme Court explained that its holding in Drabic was consistent with its holding in Freundt because the key language remained consistent, "conviction of ... any ... offense." Id. at 678, 906 A.2d at 1158 On appeal to our Supreme Court, it said that the sole issue was whether the doctrine of merger even applied when collateral civil consequences were imposed. The Court held: In the first instance, the parties disagree as to whether the doctrine of merger even applies in the instant context, i.e., when collateral civil consequences are imposed. We need not directly address this question, since we believe the plain language of the statute 75 Pa. C.S. 1532 directs that only a single suspension can be imposed based upon a single criminal episode. Drabic, 588 Pa. at 675-676, 906 A.2d at 1156.