In Glen-Gery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Dover Township, 589 Pa. 135, 907 A.2d 1033 (2006) (Glen-Gery), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that "a claim alleging a procedural defect affecting notice or due process rights in the enactment of an ordinance may be brought notwithstanding the provisions of Section 909.1(a)(2) and Section 5571(c)(5) because, if proven, the ordinance would be rendered void ab initio." Glen-Gery, 589 Pa. at 139, 907 A.2d at 1035. "The doctrine of void ab initio is a legal theory stating that a statute held unconstitutional is void in its entirety and is treated as if it had never existed." Hawk v. Eldred Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 983 A.2d 216, 219 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). It serves to invalidate an ordinance from its inception, thereby rendering the statutory time limits set forth in Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC and Section 5571(c)(5) of the Judicial Code irrelevant. Section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC, 53 P.S. 10909.1(a)(2), and Section 5571(c)(5) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. 5571(c)(5), provided as a general rule at the time this challenge was filed, that anyone who wished to challenge the validity of an ordinance on procedural grounds was required to raise his claim within 30 days of the effective date of the ordinance.