In Lawson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d 85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), appeal denied, Pa. 992 A.2d 890 (2010), the revocation hearing was held more than nine months after the parolee's new conviction, but within 61 days of receipt of the official verification of that conviction. The parole agent testified that a problem with the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas had caused the delay. Lawson argued that under Ramos, the agent had to explain the reason for the delay in the transmittal of the Court's conviction record in order for the Board's hearing to be timely. The Court rejected Lawson's interpretation of Ramos and Fitzhugh. Specifically, we stated: Turning to Ramos, it is true, as Lawson points out, that this Court cited Fitzhugh for the proposition that "if there is a delay between the time the Board has notice of the conviction and the time when the Board receives official verification of the conviction, the Board has the burden of proving that the delay was not unreasonable and unjustifiable." This quoted language does not relate to the central issue in Ramos, which was one of evidence, i.e., whether the Board could take official notice of statements in the parole agent's report that she attempted to obtain verification on three occasions and otherwise acted appropriately. This Court held that the Board could not take official notice of such statements, which were inadmissible hearsay. The characterization of the Fitzhugh holding in Ramos was not relevant to the holding and was, therefore, dicta. Lawson, 977 A.2d at 88. The Court concluded in Lawson that the timeliness of a parole revocation hearing is governed by the Parole Act and the regulation at 37 Pa. Code 71.4(1). Neither places a burden on the Board to demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in obtaining official verification of a parolee's new conviction. Lawson, 977 A.2d at 88. Indeed, the Court explained this holding was consistent with our long-standing precedent.