In Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 599, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (1999), the supreme court explained that "the collateral order doctrine remains a specialized, practical application of the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right." Thus, the court found it appropriate to interpret Rule 313 narrowly and to characterize the requirements for an appealable collateral order as "stringent." Id. To that end, courts have required that each prong of the collateral order doctrine: (1) separability; (2) importance; (3) irreparable loss -- must be clearly present before an order may be considered collateral. Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42 (2003). In Geniviva, our supreme court elaborated on the second prong of the collateral order test so as to narrow the category of collateral orders. The court, in considering what "right" is "too important to be denied review" for purposes of defining an order as collateral under Pa. R.A.P. 313, held that "it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather, it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand." Geniviva, 555 Pa. at 598, 725 A.2d at 1214.