In Symons v. National Electric Products, Inc., 414 Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964), our supreme court held that, in drafting section 306(c)(23), the legislature conferred upon the WCAB the discretion to determine whether, in some circumstances, application of the statutory presumption of total disability would not be warranted. The claimant in Symons suffered an amputation of both legs and thereafter, participated in an extraordinary rehabilitation program. The program included the use of boots containing an articulating foot, and the claimant eventually became extremely agile and self-sufficient in the use of these boots. The claimant subsequently received new prostheses in the form of artificial legs. After the claimant successfully adapted himself to such a commendable extent, he returned to work as an inspector with his time-of-injury employer. The job the claimant performed was not artificially created for him but was a job in existence prior to the claimant's injury and was performed by other, non-disabled employees. The claimant performed his work with no more assistance than was provided to any other inspector. He drove his own car, parked it on the employer's premises and walked to the job site without assistance. The claimant's job was not temporary but was likely to continue. At the time of the hearing, the claimant was earning more than his pre-injury wage and more than the current wage paid for his pre-injury job. Based upon its consideration of all of these facts, the WCAB vacated the referee's finding that this claimant was totally disabled and, exercising its statutory authority, substituted its own finding to the contrary. On appeal, our supreme court upheld the WCAB's decision, first setting forth the facts as summarized above, then concluding that the WCAB had exercised its discretion and "otherwise determined" that this claimant had been so far rehabilitated that he was not totally disabled by his bilateral specific loss. The court in Symons emphasized that the discretion conferred upon the WCAB was the critical factor in the court's analysis: To accept appellant's theory in this case that the loss of both legs entitled him to the continued payment of compensation for total disability despite the fact that the board determined otherwise on the evidence before it would require us to ignore the legislative language 'unless the board shall otherwise determine' as well as to violate the rules of statutory construction. Id. at 514, 200 A.2d at 875. The court stated that, "although it may be argued that the board cannot find other than total disability where there is a loss of both legs, such argument flies directly in the face of the language of Section 306(c) that the loss constitutes total disability 'unless the board shall otherwise determine.'" Id. at 516, 200 A.2d at 877. The court repeated: "The Legislature has vested a discretionary power in the board. That discretion may be removed or diminished only by the Legislature." Id.