Township of Derry v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry

In Township of Derry v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, 593 Pa. 480, 932 A.2d 56 (2007) the Court dismissed as unripe the appellant's petition for review challenging the Department of Labor and Industry's regulations that implemented an overly broad construction of the term "state-owned buildings" to include the buildings at the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center located in the township. The appellant argued that the regulations along with application of the Pennsylvania Construction Code Act, 35 P.S. 7210.101-7210.1103, effectively displaced the ability of municipalities to review and to approve construction plans, to issue building permits and to collect fees with regard to the construction of certain non-Commonwealth buildings. The appellant identified particular construction projects at the Medical Center where local ordinances had not been followed. The Court declined to address issues raised in preliminary objections filed by the Department and the Medical Center based on application of the ripeness doctrine. It then dismissed the appellant's petition for review with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed. It agreed with this Court's statement in Township of Derry that when determining whether a matter is ripe for judicial review courts generally consider whether the issues are adequately developed and whether hardship will ensue to the parties if review is delayed. The Court also stated that under the hardship analysis, it might nonetheless address the merits even when a case is not as fully developed as the Court would like where declining to address the merits could place a demonstrable hardship upon a party, citing Alaica v. Ridge, 784 A.2d 837 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Notwithstanding its agreement with this statement of the ripeness doctrine, the Supreme Court held that this Court erred in dismissing the petition on ripeness grounds where allegations of the appellant's petition reflect an actual and ongoing controversy and in considering hardship it is enough that the appellant has alleged major, ongoing construction activity being conducted within its borders outside of the local ordinance process.