Trosky v. Civil Service Commission, City of Pittsburgh

In Trosky v. Civil Service Commission, City of Pittsburgh, 539 Pa. 356, 652 A.2d 813 (1995), in early December 1990, nine vacancies for promotion to the rank of Sergeant were announced and a list of twenty-two qualified and eligible candidates was submitted to the director of the department of public safety. The director selected nine candidates for promotion and in that process struck off the names of two officers, George Trosky and Victor Cirocco, as he believed he was able to do according to the city's civil service rules. Trosky and Cirocco sought a hearing before the commission, were denied and proceeded to file an appeal to the common pleas court. The common pleas court ordered that they be promoted to the rank of sergeant with back-pay and benefits. An appeal to this Court followed and we affirmed the order of the common pleas court. Subsequently, the city and the commission filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the same was granted. Before the Supreme Court, the city argued that the only remedy available to Trosky and Cirocco for their improper removal from the eligibility list was reinstatement to the list. It asserted that any other action, especially the court-ordered promotion, usurped the authority and discretion of the director in determining promotions which was in direct contravention of Section 6 of the Police Civil Service Act. Finally, it argued that the relief granted by the common pleas court placed the officers in a better position than they would have been had their names not been removed, as they provided no evidence that they would have been selected. To the contrary, Trosky and Cirocco argued that the common pleas court had the authority to order their promotion because it was the only available remedy and reinstatement to the eligibility list was no relief at all. The officers argued that the common pleas court's decision was proper pursuant to the law espoused in employment cases, according to the principles of local agency law and within the general powers of the court in fashioning an appropriate order. The Supreme Court reversed the order of this Court and vacated the order of the common pleas court, concluding that the relief ordered by the latter was "substantially greater than was necessary" to achieve the objective of making the plaintiff whole, as far as possible, and securing justice to the injured party. Trosky, 652 A.2d at 817. The Court further considered the effect that the common pleas court's order had on the discretion vested in the director and concluded that the relief ordered "had the effect of interfering with the decision-making authority accorded by statute" as well as requiring the promotion of two officers whom the director might "lawfully have determined should not be promoted." Trosky, 652 A.2d at 818. Additionally, the Court noted that the relief ordered required the creation of two positions within the rank of Sergeant without any regard to the administrative consequences of such action. Finally, the Supreme Court considered the specific harm to the officers and concluded that in order to return the parties to the position that they would have been in had no violation occurred, the City had to: (1) promote one candidate from among Trosky, Cirocco and two others to Sergeant; (2) ensure that the remaining officers had the opportunity to be placed on the eligibility list for the next promotion by sitting for the required test; (3) void any existing eligibility list; (4) make no other promotions until the remaining officers had the opportunity to take the required examinations. In directing this result, the Court stressed that since neither the General Civil Service Act nor the Police Civil Service Act specify what corrective measures are to be undertaken if the procedures required therein are not followed, "it is left to the courts to fashion such a remedy as may be just under the circumstances." Trosky, 652 A.2d at 817. In Trosky, the Court concluded that the common pleas court "must fashion such a remedy as may be just under the circumstances." See Trosky, 652 A.2d at 817. The Court in Trosky noted the various options available to the common pleas court, such as placement on an eligibility list for the next promotion, voiding an existing list and withholding promotions until a new list is created. The Court explained that the purpose of the remedy should be to return the party to the position he/she occupied prior to the inappropriate action, i.e., prior to the removal of the names of Trosky and Cirocco from the list.