In City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994), the Court formulated a test for official immunity's good faith element in police pursuit cases. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. In doing so, we recognized the competing interests involved in good faith cases: (1) the injustice of imposing liability on an officer whose job requires him to exercise discretion and the danger that such liability will deter his willingness to exercise that discretion for the public good; and; (2) the rights of the public who are affected by an officer's bad faith acts. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. To accommodate these competing interests, the Court constructed a test for good faith that is analogous to the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657, n.7. Under this test, an officer acts in bad faith only if he could not have reasonably reached the decision in question. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657 n.7 (citing Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1970) (holding that abuse of discretion is shown only if a trial court could not have reasonably reached the decision in question)). Thus, the Court held that to obtain summary judgment on good faith in a pursuit case, a police officer must prove that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. An officer does not have to prove that it would have been unreasonable to stop the pursuit or that all reasonably prudent officers would have continued the pursuit. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. Instead, the officer must prove only that a reasonably prudent officer might have believed that he should have continued the pursuit. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. But to controvert a police officer's summary judgment proof on good faith, the nonmovant must do more than show that a reasonably prudent officer could have decided to stop the pursuit. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657. The nonmovant must show that no reasonable person in the officer's position could have thought that the facts justified the officer's acts. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. Because this good faith test was a new legal standard, we did not apply it in Chambers, but remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657. The Court held that an officer pursuing a suspect acts in good faith if a reasonably prudent officer could have believed that the pursuit should have been continued, taking into account both the need for immediate police intervention and the risk of harm to the public. In Chambers, the Court considered in some detail official immunity's good-faith element. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. Chambers involved a high-speed police pursuit that resulted in the death of a passenger who was riding with the fleeing suspect. Id. at 652. The Court sought to articulate a good-faith standard that would strike the proper balance between two competing interests: the threat of severely hampering police officers' discretion by imposing civil liability for their mistakes, and the rights of bystanders and other innocent parties that may be trampled by an officer's gross disregard for public safety. Id. at 656 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 474 (1974)). The Court held that an officer acts in good faith in a pursuit case if: a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit. Id. This test's "could have believed" aspect requires an officer to prove only that a "reasonably prudent officer might have believed that the pursuit should have been continued." Id. at 656-57. If the officer meets this burden, the nonmovant must present evidence that "'no reasonable person in the officer's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified the officer's acts.'" Id. at 657 (quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993)).