In the context of an aggravated sexual assault, the victim's state of fear is normally established through his or her own testimony. See Brown v. State, 960 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). The defendant's conduct, i.e. acts, words, or deeds, is then examined to determine whether it was the producing cause of such fear and whether the subjective state of fear was reasonable in light of such conduct. See id. Where the objective facts of the assault would naturally cause the victim to fear for her life or serious bodily injury, it is reasonable to assume that the victim had the requisite level of fear in the absence of some specific evidence to the contrary. See id. A jury may find aggravating circumstances in a sexual assault without a deadly weapon. See Lewis v. State, 984 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet ref'd) (finding aggravating circumstances in the assault itself). It is not necessary that a threat be communicated verbally, nor is it necessary to show that the defendant could have inflicted serious bodily injury, but did not. See Mata v. State, 952 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.); See also Dalton v. State, 898 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1995, pet. ref'd.). the jury may consider an appellant's objective conduct, his acts, words, or deeds and infer from the totality of the circumstances whether an appellant's overall conduct placed the complainant in fear of serious bodily injury. Kemp v. State, 744 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd)