In Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the Legislature intended for Article 44.01(j) to permit defendants to appeal from deferred adjudication community supervision to the same extent they were permitted to appeal from regular community supervision. Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d at 625 (quoting SB 762 Second Reading, Senate Floor); accord Feagin v. State, 967 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Kirby v. State, 883 S.W.2d 669, 671 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Thus, the court held that a defendant placed on deferred adjudication probation could appeal from the order placing him on deferred adjudication even though he had not been adjudicated guilty. Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d at 626. Although a defendant placed on regular community supervision could raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when community supervision is first imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not make clear whether the right to appeal under Article 44.01(j) did away with the defendant's right, under Article 42.12, 5(b) and David, to also appeal from the order granting deferred adjudication after the adjudication of guilt. The Austin Court of Appeals and this Court have held that the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling that Article 44.01(j) provides defendants the right to appeal from an order deferring adjudication meant that a defendant who wishes to appeal from that order must appeal within thirty or ninety days from the date on which deferred adjudication is first imposed. See Session v. State, 978 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Hammack v. State, 963 S.W.2d 199, 200-01 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet).