The deletion of an alternate means of committing a charged offense is an "abandonment," not an "amendment" of the charging instrument. See Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When a statute provides multiple means for the commission of an offense and those means are subject to the same punishment, the State may plead them conjunctively. See id. However, the State is required to prove only one of the alleged means in order to support the conviction. See id. (citing Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Therefore, the State may abandon one or more of the alleged means. See Eastep, 941 S.W.2d at 133. The abandonment of an alternate means does not change the alleged offense, it merely limits the State to the remaining means. See id. Because appellant was already on notice of all of the alleged means of committing the offense, the deletion of one did not affect his notice or his ability to prepare his defense. See id.