In Ex parte Brown, 907 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), the trial court and the parties were faced with a problem: the very limited availability of a key witness for both the State and the defense. In an attempt to solve the problem, defense counsel offered to allow the witness, Lorna Beasley, to testify out of sequence or to allow her supervisor, Manuel Valadez, to testify in her place. The State rejected the proposed alternatives, and the trial court, on its own motion, declared a mistrial on the ground of manifest necessity. Before the defendant could be re-tried, he sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that re-trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court denied relief, and the Second Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court reversed, explaining that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a manifest necessity for the mistrial: "The record clearly reveal two less drastic alternatives which were available to the trial judge in lieu of a mistrial: (1) Beasley was available to testify out-of-sequence ... or; (2) Valadez could have testified in Beasley's stead. The trial judge was aware of these alternatives but neglected to address them. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not address the trial judge's failure to consider and rule out these alternatives. Because less drastic alternatives were available, the record does not support the trial judge's conclusion that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial." Id. at 843.