In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld, S.W.3d 887, 897, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1151-901 (Tex. 2000) the Court held that subchapter P's prejudgment interest damages are subject to the statutory cap. In Auld the Court were asked to reconcile the Act's damages cap with the former general prejudgment interest statute directing that "judgments in wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage cases must include prejudgment interest." Like section 16.02(b), this provision was mandatory; like subchapter P, the statute did not reference the Act's damages cap. But we held in Auld that prejudgment interest required by the general statute was subject to the Act's subchapter K damages cap. See Auld, 34 S.W.3d at 901. In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld, the Court held that prejudgment interest, payable under the interest statute enacted after Cavnar, could be recovered "on damages subject to the cap only up to the amount of the cap." Id. at 901. In other words, prejudgment interest on capped damages cannot be added to cause the judgment to exceed the statutory cap. Although the Legislature did not have prejudgment interest specifically in mind when it created the cap, the Court reasoned that it did intend to cap all common law damages except those it expressly excluded. Id. at 898. Thus, when Cavnar extended prejudgment interest to personal injury and death cases, such interest came under the cap because prejudgment interest is a part of common law damages. Id. The Court recognized, however, that the Legislature's subsequent codification of its own prejudgment interest statute created a potential conflict with the cap on medical malpractice damages because the prejudgment interest statute mandated the award of prejudgment interest while the cap prevented its recovery in some cases. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, 6(a) ("A judgment in a wrongful death, personal injury, or property damages case must include prejudgment interest.") with id. art. 4590i, 11.02(a) (directing that a defendant's civil liability for damages be limited to a statutorily-determined amount). The Court reconciled the conflict in favor of the cap, relying on a maxim of statutory construction, and the Legislature's perceived purpose for capping health-care liability damages. Applying the statutory construction principle that the more specific statute controls over the more general, the Court wrote: With regard to the cap in article 4590i, section 11.02 and the general prejudgment-interest statute in article 5069-1.05, the former is the more specific statute in that it applies only to health-care liability claims, while the latter is more general because it applies to broader categories of claims, including all types of personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death. Thus, the cap in article 4590i prevails over the general prejudgment-interest statute.Auld, 34 S.W.3d at 901.