In In re Thacker, 881 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1994), Thacker, a lawyer, was convicted of accepting or agreeing to accept "a thing of value for the delivery of a child to another or for the possession of the child by another for purposes of adoption." Thacker was convicted under former section 25.11 of the Texas Penal Code, which provided: 25.11. Sale or Purchase of Child (a) A person commits an offense if he: (1) possesses a child or has the custody, conservatorship, or guardianship of a child, whether or not he has actual possession of the child, and he offers to accept, agrees to accept, or accepts a thing of value for the delivery of the child to another or for the possession of the child by another for purposes of adoption; or (2) offers to give, agrees to give, or gives a thing of value to another for acquiring or maintaining the possession of a child for the purpose of adoption. (b) It is an exception to the application of this section that the thing of value is: (1) a fee paid to a child-placing agency as authorized by law; (2) a fee paid to an attorney or physician for services rendered in the usual course of legal or medical practice; or (3) a reimbursement of legal or medical expenses incurred by a person for the benefit of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree unless the actor has been convicted previously under this section, in which event the offense is a felony of the second degree. Former TEX. PEN. CODE 25.11, renumbered as 25.08 and amended by Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3628. Thacker arranged the adoption of a mother's three children and unborn twins, and the transaction did not fall within any of the statutory exceptions. The Court recognized that Thacker's motives in the transaction might have been pure. Thacker, 881 S.W.2d at 310. But the Legislature had adopted a statute to curb "the potentially coercive effect of payments to expectant mothers," and the statute was "calculated to protect the interests of the birth father, the adoptive parents, and the interests of society at large." Id. at 309-10 The Court held that Thacker committed a crime involving moral turpitude and that compulsory discipline therefore applied even though the Penal Code did not require a finding of coercion or an adverse affect on the interests of the child, mother, father, or adoptive parents. The "interests of society at large" and the potential for "evils inherent in baby-bartering" were paramount in determining if the crime was one involving moral turpitude. Id. at 310.