In Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, no pet.), the defendant was charged with indecency with a child based on his having touched her in her vaginal area. 119 S.W.3d at 416-17. During its case in chief, the State introduced evidence which included the defendant's having: (1) previously paid money to the victim and other underage girls to remove part or all of their swimsuits; (2) provided alcohol to the victim and other underage girls; (3) offered underage girls money to run naked down the beach; (4) attempted to untie the swimsuits of the victim and her friends. Id. at 417. The State contended the evidence was admissible under article 38.37 because it had a bearing on relevant matters, including the defendant's and the victim's states of mind and the previous relationship between them. Id. at 420. The defendant agreed the evidence showing his conduct with the victim was relevant; but he disputed, under article 38.37, the relevance of the evidence of his conduct with the other girls. Id. He contended these acts had very little, if any, relevance regarding whether he was indecent with the victim of the charged offense and only tended to establish he acted in conformity with his bad character. Id. The appellate court disagreed, reasoning: Here, it would have been extremely difficult for the girls who testified to separate the defendant's actions toward the victim of the charged offense from his actions toward them because his actions and words were directed at all the girls simultaneously. Even if the girls could have somehow distinguished the defendant's conduct toward the group from the defendant's conduct specifically toward the victim, this distinction would have given the jury an inaccurate picture of the defendant's relationship with the victim. Accord Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (indicating jury is entitled to know all relevant surrounding facts and circumstances of charged offense). The defendant's prior relationship with the victim was developed through group activities that included the other girls. Their testimony was relevant to give an accurate picture of the defendant's prior relationship with the victim. Moreover, the trial court's charge instructed the jury that it could consider these acts only in determining the state of mind of the defendant and the victim and the previous or subsequent relationship between the defendant and the victim. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the extraneous offenses involving the victim were relevant under article 38.37 to prove the charged offense. (Id.) Jones alleged that the trial court erred in discharging a juror pursuant to Article 36.29(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 783-84. At trial, Jones claimed that discharge was not warranted under the statute. Jones nevertheless proposed discharge as an alternative to mistrial at least three times. Id. at 784. Because Jones requested the discharge as an alternative to mistrial, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that he was estopped from complaining about it on appeal. Id. Article 36.29(b) provides: (b) If alternate jurors have been selected in a capital case in which the state seeks the death penalty and a juror dies or becomes disabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to the jury, the alternate juror whose name was called first under Article 35.26 of this code shall replace the dead or disabled juror. Likewise, if another juror dies or becomes disabled from sitting before the charge of the court is read to the jury, the other alternate juror shall replace the second juror to die or become disabled. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 36.29(b) (West Supp. 2014). In Jones v. State, while being questioned by the State on two different occasions, the defendant made two statements regarding the murder of Berthena Bryant. Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 771. The detective read the defendant his Miranda rights before each of these statements. Id. Nine or ten days later, the defendant gave a statement to a Texas Ranger implicating himself in two extraneous murders. Id. The Texas Ranger did not read the defendant his rights until after he made his statement. Id. at 772. On appeal, the defendant argued the Texas Ranger's failure to inform the defendant of his rights before making his statement violated his Fifth Amendment rights protected by Miranda. Id. In Jones, the Court held the statement was inadmissible because the defendant was not properly warned. Id. at 776. Presiding Judge Keller, however, wrote a concurring opinion in which she provided a comprehensive study of case law from numerous jurisdictions illustrating the effectiveness of Miranda warnings and their ability to remain in effect for purposes of interviews conducted days after the administration of the warnings. Id. at 794-801 (Keller, P.J., concurring). The majority opinion recognized Judge Keller's analysis and stated "it is true that the 'mere passage of time' does not, by itself vitiate prior Miranda warnings." Id. at 774 n.13. The majority also stated "the cases cited by the concurrence are very appropriate to, and might well be dispositive of, this issue had the interrogation been by the same officer about the same murder." Id. This language supports the conclusion if appellant had made a subsequent, unwarned statement to the same officer regarding the same offense, the earlier Miranda warnings would have remained in effect. See id. The appellant argued that the trial court's discharge of a juror was inappropriate under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. The court noted that even though the appellant had argued to the trial court that discharge would be inappropriate, he nevertheless proposed discharge as an alternative to mistrial at least three times. Id. Thus, the court concluded that because the appellant had requested the discharge as an alternative to mistrial, he was estopped from complaining about it on appeal. Id.