In McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56, 68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999), the court of appeals held that the Code abrogated the plaintiff's common-law claims without reasonably substituting another remedy and thus contravened the open courts provision. 10 S.W.3d at 67-68. The Court granted the Butnarus' petition, as well as the petition in David McDavid Nissan, to resolve this conflict. At the time the trial courts and courts of appeals here and in David McDavid Nissan determined whether the Board had exclusive jurisdiction, section 3.01 of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code provided: (a) The board has the general and original power and jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of the distribution, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles and to do all things, whether specifically designated in this Act or implied herein, or necessary or convenient to the exercise of this power and jurisdiction, including the original jurisdiction to determine questions of its own jurisdiction. In addition to the other duties placed on the board by this Act, the board shall enforce and administer the terms of Chapter 503, Transportation Code. (b) Unless otherwise specifically provided by Texas law not in conflict with the terms of this Act, all aspects of the distribution and sale of motor vehicles shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this Act. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4413(36), 3.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998), amended by Act of May 18, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 155, 5, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 313. In David McDavid Nissan, the Court concluded that section 3.01(a), a jurisdictional provision, is a procedural and remedial statute that applied retroactively because it did not affect a vested right in that caseThe Court held that the Board's exclusive jurisdiction under section 3.01(a) required the dealer in that case to exhaust its administrative remedies to obtain a final Board finding to support its Code-based DTPA, bad faith, and oral contract claims. David In concluding that the Board's exclusive jurisdiction applied to the dealer's Code-based DTPA and bad-faith claims, we explained that the Code provides a hybrid claims-resolution process by which a dealer or manufacturer may seek damages for certain Code violations. The Court explained that the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires trial courts to allow an administrative agency to initially decide an issue when: (1) an agency is typically staffed with experts trained in handling the complex problems in the agency's purview; (2) great benefit is derived from an agency's uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations, whereas courts and juries may reach different results under similar fact situations.