In Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 662-63 (Tex. 1990), this Court considered whether a trial court erred in submitting a foreseeability instruction in a FELA case. 786 S.W.2d at 662. In that case, Mitchell sued his employer, the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad (M-K-T), for damages arising from injuries he received after he slipped on ice that formed on a locomotive engine's steps and grab-irons. Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 660. The jury charge asked: "Whose negligence, if any, was a cause, in whole or in part, however slight, of the occurrence of January 21, 1984 which has been made the basis of this suit?" Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 660. Mitchell objected to the following instruction in the jury charge about M-K-T's alleged negligence: In answering this issue, you are instructed that, before negligence, if any, can be established against the Defendant, Railroad, it must be shown that the Defendant-Railroad, through its officers, agents and/or employees, knew, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known of an unsafe condition, if any.Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 660. Mitchell argued that this instruction improperly placed the foreseeability issue before the jury. This Court concluded that the trial court's instruction forced Mitchell to prove foreseeability in order to establish causation. Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 661. The Court explained that FELA does not require a railroad employee to prove common-law proximate cause. Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 661-62. Rather, FELA only requires a plaintiff to prove that "the railroad's negligence played any part, even in the slightest, in producing the injury . . . for which damages are sought." Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 661. Therefore, the Court held that the instruction violated Mitchell's substantive rights under FELA. Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662. After concluding that the instruction improperly forced Mitchell to prove proximate cause, the Court discussed foreseeability as an element of duty. The Court noted that "the central question for our determination is whether, under the facts of this case, the court or the finder of fact should decide whether the risk was sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the defendant." Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 661. The Court determined that, when there is conflicting evidence about whether the railroad knew or should have known about the dangerous condition, this is "the type of issue which is properly and best resolved by the finder of fact." Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662. Nevertheless, the Court concluded the trial court's instruction was harmful error because it "confused the issue of foreseeability relating to duty with the concept of causation." Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662.