In Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993), the supreme court concluded that the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an otherwise partial summary judgment final for appellate purposes. Id. at 592. The supreme court since has affirmed that position in Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) and Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). Consistent with Mafrige and its progeny, this Court recently held that although Mother Hubbard language does not automatically render a judgment final, in many cases such language will be determinative. See Lowe v. Teator, (Tex. 1999). The language must be read within the context of the summary judgment order in which it appears. Id. If the language in the order preceding the Mother Hubbard clause is broad and inclusive enough to encompass all issues and parties before the court, then the clause may be read to dispose of all claims in the case not otherwise specifically addressed in the order. Lowe, slip op. at 6.