Oldham v. State

In Oldham v. State, 977 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), after Oldham had been convicted and sentenced for forgery, she filed a pro se notice of appeal and indigency. Id. at 355. The following day, the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals with a notation on the letter of assignment from the trial court that the attorney of record on appeal was "to be determined." Id. Thirty-three days later, the trial court found appellant indigent and appointed appellate counsel. Id. Shortly thereafter, appellate counsel filed a motion to abate the appeal, requesting that the case be remanded to the trial court and that the appellate time-tables begin anew to allow the appellant leave to file a motion for new trial on the ground that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 356. The Court of Appeals ultimately determined that the appellant had been denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the time for filing a motion for new trial, and therefore abated the appeal and remanded the cause to allow the appellant to pursue post-trial motions. Id. The Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the facts presented "did not rebut the presumption that the appellant was represented by counsel and that counsel acted effectively." Id. at 363. Specifically, we noted that there was no evidence in the record to show "that trial counsel thought that his duties were completed with the end of trial, and had thereafter abandoned the appellant." Id. at 362. The Court also observed: there is nothing in the record to suggest that the attorney did not discuss the merits of a motion for a new trial with the appellant, which the appellant rejected. When a motion for new trial is not filed in a case, the rebuttable presumption is that it was considered by the appellant and rejected. Id. at 363. Finally, the Court remarked that the fact that the appellant had seen her way clear to file a pro se notice of appeal was an indication that she was aware of some of her appellate rights, "and we presume she was adequately counseled unless the record affirmatively displays otherwise." Id. The Court addressed the ability of a court of appeals to extend a trial court's jurisdiction. In that case, the court of appeals abated the appeal and remanded the cause to the trial court to allow the defendant to file a motion for new trial. Although former Rule 31(a)(1) set forth a time limit on filing motions for new trial, and that time limit had expired, the court of appeals held it had the authority to extend the deadline pursuant to former Rule 2(b). The Court reversed. The Court held that former Rule 2(b) was an "escape valve" that should be used to shorten time limits when a case becomes "unduly stalled or delayed in the appellate process due to procedural rules." Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 360. The rule was not intended to be used to lengthen procedural time limits, "even in an effort to protect the substantive rights of litigants." Ibid.