In Peacock v. State 77 S.W.3d 285 (2002), the defendant received permission from authorities to move from Whitney to Fort Worth, and he reported to the probation office the specific address in Fort Worth at which he was living. He also told authorities that he was maintaining his post office box in Whitney as his mailing address and that his mother, who lived in Whitney, could be used as a contact person. In December 1997, authorities contacted the defendant through his mother. The defendant responded to the contact by reporting to the probation office, where he took and failed a drug test. After that incident, the defendant stopped reporting to the probation office. A motion to revoke was filed and a capias issued in April 1998. On April 22, the capias was entered into TCIC, and authorities sent a letter to the defendant's post office box in Whitney. No other attempt was made by authorities to contact the defendant until his eventual arrest on September 26, 1999, nearly three months after his community supervision period had expired. The Court of criminal appeals discussed a trial court's jurisdiction under the law in 2002 to revoke a defendant's community supervision after the term of community supervision had expired. A trial court could hold a hearing on a motion to revoke community supervision after the term of community supervision had expired. Id. at 287. However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke community supervision after expiration of the term unless: (1) the record showed a motion to revoke was filed and a capias was issued before the community supervision term expired; (2) the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it used due diligence in executing the capias and in holding a hearing on the motion to revoke. Id. at 287-88. The reason for this system of continuing jurisdiction was to prevent a defendant from benefitting by absconding until the expiration of the term of community supervision. Id. at 288. The reason for the requirement that the State prove due diligence was to ensure that the policy of continuing jurisdiction was exercised only in those cases where a defendant was eluding capture. Id. at 289. "Just as the probationer should not benefit from hiding, the State should not benefit by doing nothing meaningful to execute a capias, i.e., if a probationer is not being sought, there is no reason for the court to have continuing jurisdiction." Id.