In Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 706 (Tex. 2000), the Court stated that "a trial court's certification order must indicate how the claims will likely be tried so that conformance with Rule 42 may be meaningfully evaluated." Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435. On rehearing, the court of appeals stated that "we do not read . . . Bernal . . . to require a trial plan in every class certification order." 68 S.W.3d 701, 702 (op. on rehearing). State Farm asserts this language creates a sufficient conflict. However, the court of appeals' statements about the trial plan requirement are dicta. The court of appeals first held that State Farm had waived this issue by not bringing it to the court's attention until its motion for rehearing. Id. Then it stated that "even if this issue was not waived," a trial plan is not required. Id. As we noted in Bernal, conflicts jurisdiction requires that "'the conflict must be on the very question of law actually involved and determined.'" Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 430. In Bernal, we held thatit is improper to certify a class without knowing how the claims can and will likely be tried. A trial court's certification order must indicate how the claims will likely be tried so that conformance with Rule 42 may be meaningfully evaluated. "Given the plaintiffs' burden, a court cannot rely on mere assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome." 22 S.W.3d at 435. In Bernal, the Court considered an order that certified a class of more than 900 personal injury claims arising from a refinery explosion. The order proposed a three-phase trial plan in which the defendant's liability on various theories, including gross negligence, would be adjudicated first. Id. at 429. In Bernal, the Court identified a variety of less-than-rigorous approaches some appellate courts had taken in evaluating the predominance requirement for class certification, including an approach whereby the court "indulged every presumption in favor of the trial court's ruling, viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to that ruling, and frankly acknowledged that if they erred, it would be in favor of certification." 22 S.W.3d at 434. The Court rejected this and other "certify now and worry later" approaches to predominance in favor of a more "rigorous analysis." Id. at 434-35. But in reviewing the trial court's certification order under this principle, we applied an abuse of discretion standard, just as the court of appeals did here. Id. at 439. There is nothing in the court of appeals' opinion in this case to suggest that the court was uncertain about predominance and erred in favor of certification. To the contrary, the court cited Bernal for the proposition that "'a cautious approach to class certification is essential,'" and acknowledged that "'if it is not determinable from the outset that the individual issues can be considered in a manageable, time-efficient, yet fair manner, then certification is not appropriate. '" 28 S.W.3d at 204 (quoting Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435). The court then proceeded to perform an independent predominance analysis, concluding that individualized issues did not predominate. Id. at 204-08.