In Swindel v. State, 32 Tex. 102, 103-04 (1869), the defendant was charged with stealing a horse, but was discharged because the evidence showed that he stole a gelding instead. 32 Tex. at 102-03. The Court concluded that a discharge was essentially the same as an acquittal by a jury, and that double jeopardy did not bar re-prosecution for theft of the gelding because "the theft of any one of the animals constitute a separate offense." Id. at 103. That is no doubt true, but the facts of Swindel reflected that the defendant stole only one animal, not two. The animal was a gelding, which, of course, is a type of horse. The Swindel Court reasoned that there were two separate offenses here because the statute distinguished between a gelding and a horse. Id. at 103-04. But the fact that the statute made that distinction does not mean that the defendant committed two offenses. The Swindel Court cited no authority for the proposition that the defendant could be prosecuted twice for stealing the same animal when the State "erred" in its initial indictment by alleging a horse instead of a gelding.