In State v. Garza, 931 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that failure to rule on a motion for new trial by written order resulted in its being overruled by operation of law. Garza, 931 S.W.2d at 562. Garza, however, was decided under former appellate rule 31. See TEX. R. APP. P. Rule 31(e). That rule provided, in pertinent part: (1) Time to Rule. the court shall determine a motion for new trial within 75 days after the date sentence is imposed or suspended in open court. (3) Failure to Rule. a motion not timely determined by written order signed by the judge shall be considered overruled by operation of law upon expiration of the period of time prescribed in section (e)(1) of this rule. Id. It is facially apparent that the subject matter now found in rule 21.8. and formerly found in rule 31(e), are substantively and procedurally similar. See State v. Rinehart, 971 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1997, no. pet.). There is ample authority governing the overruling of a motion for new trial once seventy-five days have elapsed from the date the trial court imposed sentence in open court. Those cases universally stand for the same proposition found in Garza; namely, that once a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law because the seventy-five day time limit has elapsed, the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See: State ex rel. Cobb v. Godfrey, 739 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Zaragosa v. State, 588 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Crim. App.1979); Williams v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 356, 269 S.W. 434 (1925); Johnson v. State, 925 S.W.2d 745, 747-48 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, no pet.); Meek v. State, 628 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref'd).