Tigner v. State

In Tigner v. State 928 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), the Court construed the word "criminal proceeding" to encompass voir dire as part of the trial in a criminal prosecution. In so doing, we relied upon the language of the statute, the legislative history, and commentary from Professors Dix and Dawson's treatise on criminal procedure. Id. at 543-546. The Court observed that the phrase "criminal proceeding" is a "very broad" term, "conceivably extending to all phases of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 544. After examining the legislative history, we found that the purpose of the twenty-day requirement was to give defense counsel "adequate time to prepare possible challenges to the admissibility or credibility" of the recorded statements at issue. Id. at 545. The Court referred to one senator's remarks that the time requirement would enable testing of the recording to determine whether any splicing, alteration, or other improprieties had occurred. The provision's author indicated that the twenty-day requirement would enable counsel to have a copy of the recording with ample time to plea bargain. The Court found that these purposes would be frustrated in many cases if defense counsel were unable to obtain a copy of the recording before voir dire and that defense counsel might be precluded from questioning the venire about the application of Article 38.22. Finally, we cited Professors Dix and Dawson's opinion that the term "proceeding" includes a pretrial hearing "if there is one." IdThe Court held that this language applied to 3(a)(5), and required that we "strictly advance the Legislature's purpose to declare inadmissible all custodial statements not provided to defense counsel with ample time to effectively challenge their admissibility." Art. 38.22, 3(a)(1) makes no distinction between in-state and out-of-state oral statements, made as a result of custodial interrogation, which are not in compliance with its dictates.