In Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 217-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 490 U.S. 754, 104 L. Ed. 2d 834, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) the prosecutor in Tompkins referred to the defendant as an "animal" during closing arguments of the sentencing phase. Id. at 217. There was an objection, an instruction to disregard, and a motion for mistrial, which was denied. Id. The Tompkins court disapproved of the prosecutor's remark, but acknowledged there were past Court of Criminal Appeals cases that found similar remarks a proper deduction from the evidence and also cases that reversed convictions for such remarks. See id. at 217-18. Accordingly, the court stated that "whether such an argument will constitute reversible error, however, must be decided on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 217. Assuming the State's reference to appellant as a "monster" was not proper, improper jury argument will not warrant reversal unless the argument, when considered in light of the entire record, is "extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute, or injects new facts into the case that are harmful to the defendant." Id. at 218. Further, an instruction to disregard will generally cure any improper argument. Id.