Injury to a child is a "specific result" offense. This means that it requires a culpable mental state which relates not to the nature of the circumstances surrounding the charged conduct, but to the result of the conduct. Banks v. State, 819 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd); Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Result-oriented offenses require specific mental culpability beyond intentional conduct. Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). An actor is said to act with intent with respect to the result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). In such a prosecution, the State is required to put on some evidence that the accused either acted with intent to cause serious bodily injury to the child or knew that his actions were reasonably certain to cause that result. Withers v. State, 994 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). Proof of a culpable mental state is often made by circumstantial evidence. See Gardner v. State, 736 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), aff'd, 780 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Proof of knowledge is an inference that may be drawn by the fact finder both from direct evidence and from evidence of the circumstances surrounding the act. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Cantu v. State, 944 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref'd). A jury can infer knowledge or intent from the acts, conduct, and remarks of the accused and from the surrounding circumstances. Withers, 994 S.W.2d at 746; Ortiz v. State, 930 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no pet.); Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 652 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd).