In Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743, 292 S.E.2d 373 (1982), the defendant was suspected of manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP). During the investigation, police officers followed the defendant to his parents' farmhouse. In the woods surrounding the house, the officers found several items commonly used in the manufacture of PCP. The officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the farmhouse and discovered many articles used in manufacturing PCP, various chemicals used in manufacturing the drug, and thirty grams of finished PCP in several abandoned vehicles on the property. The defendant was apprehended in his car at a truck stop. In the defendant's car, the officers found a plastic bag containing cigarettes laced with PCP. The defendant was charged with manufacturing PCP, based on the evidence found at the farmhouse and in the abandoned vehicles, and was charged with possession of PCP, based on the evidence found in his car. The offenses were tried separately, and the defendant was acquitted of the possession charge. At the trial for the manufacturing charge, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant's possession of the PCP laced cigarettes. The defendant was convicted of manufacturing PCP. On appeal, Rhodes argued that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the PCP laced cigarettes. He argued that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from using the evidence because he had been acquitted of the possession charge. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the "defendant was not, in the manufacturing case, on trial for the crime of possession of PCP found in his car." 223 Va. at 748, 292 S.E.2d at 376. While the Court stated that, "possession and manufacturing are two separate and distinct offenses, each of which requires proof of a fact which the other does not," id., the statement was made in the context of the facts of that case, which involved separate and distinct offenses committed on separate occasions. The Court specifically noted that the possession charge required proof of facts and circumstances that were separate and distinct from those of the manufacturing charge. The Court expressly noted that the case was distinguishable "from one in which a defendant, accused of the manufacture or distribution of controlled drugs, is also charged with possession of the same drugs, at the same time and place." Id. at 748 n.1, 292 S.E.2d at 376 n.1.