In Gaynor v. Hird, No. 0927-94-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995), the Court addressed Gaynor's appeal of the trial court's April 19, 1994 order awarding interest to Hird. She argued that the applicable version of Code 20-107.3 did not provide for the rendering of a judgment for a monetary award. Only much later did the legislature provide for a monetary award to be classified as a judgment. No mention was made at the November 23, 1993 hearing of a request for interest in these items, yet now an award is made to Hird. There is no basis in the record for this award. Consequently, the issue was not before the trial court and such an award cannot stand. The Court held that Hird was not entitled to any prejudgment interest arising from 1986. We also ruled that "the amount that equalized the division of the marital personal property was not a separately due and payable award, and it was error to treat it as such." The Court then stated: "Additionally, the version of Code 20-107.3(D) in effect when this case was filed does not provide that a monetary award is a judgment and that the interest of provisions of Code 8.01-382 apply." Id. The Court found that the trial court erred when it ruled that Gaynor was entitled to one-half the rental value of the former marital residence occupied exclusively by Hird, but was required to reimburse Hird for all mortgage, taxes and insurance expenses he paid. The Court held that Gaynor, as a co-tenant not in possession, was entitled to one-half the monthly rental value of $ 2,000 for the period October 1, 1985 to June 29, 1993, reduced by one-half the mortgage and taxes paid by Hird, and including credits for any expenses previously paid by Gaynor. The Court also directed the trial court to include an award of "interest, at the legal rate of interest, on the monthly amount accruing from October 1, 1985 the date of divorce." During the hearing on remand, the trial court and the parties explicitly discussed the question of interest payable to Hird based upon our ruling in Gaynor, No. 0927-94-4. In its order entered September 23, 1996, the trial court held that based upon our decision in No. 0927-94-4, it could not award Hird amounts attributable to interest. Gaynor subsequently appealed this order, which was affirmed in all respects in our decision of June 9, 1998.