Alexander v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation

In Alexander v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 890, a speeding plaintiff collided with a car driven by a third party who failed to obey a stop sign. Although a jury found a dangerous condition existed at the intersection, the trial court granted the state judgment notwithstanding the verdict concluding one or both of the drivers' failure to obey to traffic laws precluded a finding the intersection had been "used with due care" and thus, "as a matter of law, no dangerous condition existed at the intersection." (Id. at pp. 895, 897.) In reversing, the court held, "so long as a plaintiff-user can establish a condition of the property creates a substantial risk to any foreseeable user of the public property who uses it with due care, he has successfully alleged the existence of a dangerous condition regardless of his personal lack of due care. Although a public entity may assert the negligence of a plaintiff-user as a defense, it has no bearing on the determination of a dangerous condition in the first instance." (Id. at p. 901.) In Alexander v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1984) a trial court was reversed for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the public entity. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had apparently considered the plaintiff's negligence in deciding the issue of whether there was a dangerous condition. It had also usurped the jury's fact finding role. The trial judge had erroneously decided as a matter of law that the plaintiff's violation of traffic laws meant there could be no dangerous road condition liability because the plaintiff did not use the road "with due care." (Ibid.) The court held, "So long as a plaintiff-user can establish a condition on the property creates a substantial risk to any foreseeable user of the public property who uses it with due care, he has successfully alleged the existence of a dangerous condition regardless of his personal lack of due care." (Id. at p. 901.)