In Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, an elementary school student sued the school district after being sexually molested by a custodian in his office. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint on demurrer, explaining: "The general rule of respondeat superior at common law for nongovernmental employers is the same as that set forth in the Government Code for public employers: An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the course or scope of their employment. . . . ". . . 'The determination as to whether an employee committed a tort during the course of his employment turns on whether or not: 1) the act performed was either required or "incident to his duties" . . . , or 2) the employee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in any event . . . .' . . . If an employee's actions fall within the range of actions covered by either part of this two-prong test, the employer will be liable for the wrong, even though the employee has acted maliciously and intentionally. . . . "In assessing whether an employee's wrongful act was required by or incidental to his duties, the law defines occupational duties broadly. The fact that an employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment at the time of his wrongful act does not preclude attribution of liability to an employer. . . . But if an employee substantially deviates from his duties for personal purposes, the employer is not vicariously liable for the employee's actions. . . . "This case presents us with a factual situation where the connection between the employee's duties and the employee's wrongful action has become so attenuated that the law will not hold the employer vicariously liable. Sexual molestation is in no way related to mopping floors, cleaning rooms, or any of the other tasks that are required of a school custodian. Though there may be those cases where personal motivations so mingle with the employee's pursuit of occupational duties that it is arguable whether the employee's action is incidental to his duties, this is not such a case. The custodian's action, prompted by wholly personal motivations, was clearly not required or incidental to his duties as a school custodian. ". . . Where an employee pursues his own ends, the use of property or facilities entrusted to him by the school is an inadequate basis for imputing liability to the employer . . . . The custodian's use of the janitor's office, which arguably furnished a unique opportunity for his action, does not impute liability to the school district. The mere fact that an employee has the opportunity to abuse facilities necessary to the performance of his duties does not render an employer vicariously liable for the abuse. "Nor does the fact that the offense occurred during working hours make the custodian's action incidental to his employment. . . . Mere presence at the place of employment before, during, or after the commission of the offense has not been a decisive factor in resolving the scope of employment issue. . . . If an employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. ". . . The custodian's act of rape was not an integral part of a course of action on behalf of his employer, but rather an independent, self-serving pursuit wholly unrelated to his custodial duties." (Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pp. 138-141, citations omitted.) The court in Alma W. continued: "We now turn to the second part of our inquiry: Whether the employee's misconduct was foreseeable in any event. . . . '"Foreseeability" in this context must be distinguished from "foreseeability" as a test for negligence. In the latter sense "foreseeable" means a level of probability which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions whereas "foreseeability" as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business. . . . In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one "that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental" to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. . . .' . . . It defies every notion of fairness to say that rape is characteristic of a school district's activities. ". . . While it might be foreseeable for a school custodian to become involved in a dispute over the manner in which he swept the floors or cleaned a classroom and for the dispute to end in someone being hit with a mop, the same statement cannot be made with reference to rape. There is no aspect of a janitor's duties that would make sexual assault anything other than highly unusual and very startling. . . . "Distilled to its essence, the plaintiff's argument is little more than that the risk of loss from an employee's sexual assault should fall on the school district as a means of spreading the risk to the community at large. . . . Even assuming that schools are equipped, as are businesses, to absorb the costs of employees' torts in that schools are able indirectly to absorb and distribute the costs through taxation to the community at large, the rationale for vicarious liability does not justify allocating the risk of sexual assaults by a school employee to the community at large. . . . A sexual assault simply does not fall within the range of risks allocable to an employer. ". . . The act of rape is not attributable to the school district because it is neither a required or incidental duty of a school employee, nor is it a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the educational enterprise. We will not depart from settled precedent to establish a rule that would divert limited educational funds to create a new compulsory insurance fund which would cover virtually all torts of an employee occurring during working hours at the place of employment, regardless of the extremity or personal nature of the act." (Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at pp. 141-144.) The Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held as a matter of law a school district could not be held vicariously liable for a custodian's alleged sexual assault on a student. The Court of Appeal concluded there were no grounds for finding the assailant acted within the scope of his employment. The sexual assault was neither required nor incident to the custodian's duties, i.e., the connection between his duties and his wrongful act were too "attenuated." ( Id. at pp. 139-140.) Our First District colleagues stated: "Sexual molestation is in no way related to mopping floors, cleaning rooms, or any of the other tasks that are required of a school custodian." ( Id. at p. 140.) The Court of Appeal also held the sexual assault was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the educational enterprise and noted, "It defies every notion of fairness to say that rape is characteristic of a school district's activities." ( Id. at p. 142.)