In Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 494, the Second District Court of Appeal held that an employer enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability for the disclosure of confidential information to a law enforcement agency during a background investigation. Plaintiff Odette Moradi, whose dream had been to become a correctional officer, was rejected by the Department of Corrections based on information supplied by her former employer, Pimentel Private Security (Pimentel). She claims Bardin is "bad law" and urges us to reject it. In Bardin, the plaintiff's application to become a police officer was rejected based on information the Los Angeles Police Department received from her former employer, Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, as a part of its background investigation. In her complaint for breach of contract and various tort causes of action, the plaintiff alleged that Lockheed made false statements about her employment without a good faith belief in the truth of the information. The trial court granted Lockheed's motion for summary judgment, finding the employer had an absolute privilege under section 1031.1, subdivision (b). (Bardin, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498-499.) The Bardin court aptly observed that the first sentence of subdivision (b) of section 1031.1, including the language "in the absence of fraud or malice," provides employers with a qualified or conditional privilege. The second sentence, however, preserves the existing common law privileges and immunities of an employer. (Bardin, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-502.) If, then, the existing privileges are absolute, the subdivision is inconsistent because the first sentence taketh away what the second sentence giveth. Bardin concluded that the common law immunity as explained in O'Shea v. General Telephone Co. (1987) 193 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 238 Cal. Rptr. 715 (O'Shea) did provide employers absolute immunity and, therefore, subdivision (b) is ambiguous. (Bardin, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 497-498.) The Bardin court reached the same conclusion: "The savings clause in the second sentence of section 1031.1, subdivision (b) preserves the existing common law and statutory privileges. These are subject to change, through judicial decision or legislative action. In the event an absolute privilege becomes unavailable in the future, either by a change in the common law or by amendment to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), the qualified privilege of section 1031.1 would still apply. Since we interpret section 1031.1, subdivision (b) to preserve common law and statutory privileges, respondents had an absolute privilege under O'Shea." (Bardin, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 504.)