In Barthuli v. Board of Trustees (1977) 19 Cal.3d 717, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner's contract for the position of associate superintendent conferred no statutory right to that position, and thus no property interest in that position. The court further concluded that the petitioner had no constitutional right to notice, specification of reasons for termination or opportunity to respond prior to termination from that position, such as would be enjoyed if he had acquired a property interest in the position. The court nonetheless indicated that the petitioner retained the right to sue for damages for breach of contract, affirming a ruling by the trial court that mandamus would not lie, in part, because the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law in an action for breach of contract. ( Id. at p. 720.) The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate to compel a school district to reinstate the petitioner to his former position as an associate superintendent for business. (Id. at pp. 719, 723.) In that case, the school district's board voted to rescind the petitioner's four-year contract after only one year based on his purported breach of his employment contract. (Id. at pp. 719-720.) The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate relief, finding the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law in a breach of contract cause of action. 5 (Barthuli, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 720.) On appeal, the California Supreme Court noted "reinstatement has been recognized as an appropriate remedy when an employee has been discharged in violation of his statutory rights or constitutional rights ." (Ibid.) However, after an analysis of the statutory scheme involving school district administrators, Barthuli concluded those administrators do not have a statutory right to their positions as administrators. (Id. at pp. 720-723.) It quoted from a section of the Education Code substantially similar to section 72411, subdivision (a), which is involved in the instant case. (Barthuli, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 720-721.) Barthuli stated: "Section 13314 ( 44893, 87454) provided that a tenured teacher 'when advanced from a teaching position to an administrative or supervisory position ... shall retain his permanent classification as a classroom teacher.' Section 13315 ( 44897, 87458) stated: 'A person employed in an administrative or supervisory position requiring certification qualifications upon completing a probationary period, including any time served as a classroom teacher, in the same district, shall ... be classified as and become a permanent employee as a classroom teacher.' "Although numerous statutes list grounds for teacher dismissal, providing hearings for charges of teacher misconduct, there are no similar statutory provisions governing assistant superintendent misconduct. "In the absence of such provisions sections 13314 ( 44893, 87454) and 13315 ( 44897, 87458) must be read as establishing that administrative and supervisory personnel do not possess a statutory right to their positions. The statutes vest such persons with rights to the position of classroom teachers, not to administrative positions." (Barthuli, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 721.) Barthuli noted the petitioner had not sought reinstatement to his position as a classroom teacher or alleged he would be refused such a position. (Barthuli, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 721.) Barthuli concluded: "In the absence of a deprivation of a constitutional right (which deprivation Barthuli concluded did not exist), reinstatement to his former position is not an available remedy for a discharged associate superintendent; reinstatement is available only to the position of classroom teacher." (Ibid.) Barthuli further stated: "Petitioner, in his position as an administrator, is not a permanent employee. The Legislature has not given him a property right in the administrative position. Rather, the Legislature has made clear by sections 13314 ( 44893, 87454) and 13315 ( 44897, 87458) that petitioner's tenure rights and thus his property rights are those of a classroom teacher and not those of an administrator." (Barthuli, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 722-723, ) Because the petitioner had neither a statutory right nor a property right to his former administrative position with the school district, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate seeking reinstatement to his administrative position. (Id. at p. 723.)