In Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1586, a tenant brought a wrongful eviction action against his landlord alleging, among other things, violation of the owner move-in provisions of San Francisco's rent control ordinance. (Id. at pp. 1590-1591 & fn. 1.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against the landlord and ruled the tenant was entitled to attorney fees under section 1717 and the lease, which read: "If any action or suit shall be brought by owner or agent for the recovery of any rent due, or to enforce any right hereby conferred, or for the recovery of possession of said premises, tenant shall pay to owner, or agent, such attorney's fees and costs as the Court shall determine to be reasonable." (Id. at pp. 1607-1608.) The court found that "while respondent's action implicated provisions of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance, in our opinion the suit fundamentally was based upon the lease, in that respondent sought compensation for appellant's wrongful interference with respondent's occupation and enjoyment of the leased premises." (Id. at p. 1608.) The Court held that the failure of a tenant to include damages for mental anguish among actual and special damages listed in his complaint for wrongful eviction did not preclude trebling of the damages awarded for pain and suffering under the rent control ordinance. The ordinance provided for trebling of actual damages, which we held consisted of both general and special damages. In so concluding, the Court looked to the standard definition of "actual damages." "First, 'actual damages consist of both general and special damages.' (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979).)" (Beeman, at p. 1601.) The Court noted that, "Actual damages are further defined as 'real, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury, as opposed on the one hand to "nominal" damages, and on the other to "exemplary" or "punitive" damages.' (Black's Law Dic, at p. 352.)" (Beeman, at p. 1601, fn. 9.) In sum, an individual sued his former landlord claiming that the landlord had wrongfully evicted him with the intention of renting the vacated unit at a higher rate in violation of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. (Id. at p. 1591.) The complaint contained 14 causes of action, including negligence, constructive eviction, fraud, and violation of the rent ordinance. (Ibid.) The landlord defaulted and the former tenant obtained a default judgment. The issues on appeal included the propriety of granting the default judgment and the nature of the damages imposed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and concluded that the tenant was entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to section 1717 and an attorney's fees provision in his lease, which applied to actions to "enforce any right . . . conferred" by the lease and actions for the recovery of the premises. (Id. at p. 1607.) The court explained the while the tenant's action implicated provisions of the rent ordinance, "the suit fundamentally was based on the lease, in that the tenant sought compensation for the landlord's wrongful interference with the tenant's occupation and enjoyment of the leased premises." (Id. at p. 1608.) The court held that because it was "affirming the judgment in its entirety, there can be no doubt that the tenant is the 'prevailing party' for purposes of the award of attorney's fees . . . ." (Id. at p. 1608, fn. 18.)