In Berg v. Darden (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 721, Berg, contended that his pretrial offer of settlement was sufficiently specific to satisfy the statutory requirements. The plaintiff insisted it was not. She argued that the "offer was insufficient to show that its acceptance would result in a final disposition of the underlying action, because the offer failed to indicate whether she: (1) sought to have judgment entered against Darden; (2) sought to have an 'award' entered in her favor, or (3) was willing to dismiss her malpractice action with prejudice." (Id. at p. 728.) Providing an offeree some latitude, the Court of Appeal found the offer sufficiently certain to trigger the cost-shifting penalty. The court explained: "So long as it is clear that the written offer of compromise is made under section 998 and, if accepted, will result in entry of judgment--the expected and standard procedural result unless specific terms and conditions stated in the offer provide otherwise--the offer need not identically track the language of the statute under which it is made. If the offeree is uncertain about some aspect of the offer, or would prefer the action be dismissed rather than have a judgment entered against him, he is free to explore those matters with the offeror, or even to make counterproposals during the period in which the statutory offer remains outstanding. By doing so, he will not run the risk of having the original offer revoked and may still accept that offer on the terms extended." (Berg, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 730-731.) In Berg v. Darden, the issue was whether the language of the offer was clear enough to show that its acceptance would result in a final disposition of the underlying lawsuit. Berg's offer letter referred to section 998 and specified a settlement amount of $ 225,000. It then warned the defendant that if he did not accept the offer within 30 days and the plaintiff obtained a more favorable judgment, she would "seek the full panoply of 998 awards." (Id. at p. 725.) The letter did not, however, specifically describe the method by which the plaintiff intended to dispose of the case in the event that the defendant rejected her offer. Although the jury later awarded Berg a significantly higher amount in damages, the trial judge denied the plaintiff her costs, finding the settlement offer ineffective. The appellate court reversed. The court explained that settlement offers must be clear, precise, and specific. Indeed, "it is in the best interests of the parties and the court that section 998 offers be as clear, straightforward and thorough as possible." (Id. at p. 728.) In Berg's case, however, the failure to describe in detail her intended disposition of the case was not fatal. By referring to the statute and proposing settlement, the offer, if accepted, would have resulted in entry of judgment against the defendant. Thus, "an otherwise clear section 998 offer is not rendered invalid simply because it does not track precisely the language of the statute." (Id. at p. 728.)