In Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 693 P.2d 796, the case cited but not discussed by Borg--the Supreme Court established a limited exception to this general rule. The court held that when an insurer has tortiously withheld insurance benefits from its insured, the latter may recover the attorney fees reasonably incurred to compel the insurer to pay such benefits, as an element of the damages resulting from such tortious conduct. However, the Supreme Court was careful to limit the scope of this exception to attorney fees incurred in recovering benefits denied as a proximate cause of the insurer's tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and not any fees incurred in bringing the bad faith action itself, or in order to recover other extra-contractual damages such as punitive damages, damages for emotional distress, or prejudgment interest. ( Id. at pp. 815, 817, 819-820 & fn. 8.) " 'It is well settled that if an insurer, in discharging its contractual responsibilities, "fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." When such a breach occurs, the insurer is "liable for any damages which are the proximate result of that breach." When an insurer's tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney's fees are an economic loss--damages--proximately caused by the tort. These fees must be distinguished from recovery of attorney's fees qua attorney's fees, such as those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself. What we consider here is attorney's fees that are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action. 'When a pedestrian is struck by a car, he goes to a physician for treatment of his injuries, and the motorist, if liable in tort, must pay the pedestrian's medical fees. Similarly, in the present case, an insurance company's refusal to pay benefits has required the insured to seek the services of an attorney to obtain those benefits, and the insurer, because its conduct was tortious, should pay the insured's legal fees.'" ( Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817.) The Brandt court specified a procedure for awarding attorney fees as an element of the damages proximately caused by the insurer's tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "Since the attorney's fees are recoverable as damages, the determination of the recoverable fees must be made by the trier of fact unless the parties stipulate otherwise." ( Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 819.) The Supreme Court noted that a stipulation for postjudgment allocation and award of such damages by the trial court itself "would normally be preferable since the determination then would be made after completion of the legal services citation, and proof that otherwise would have been presented to the jury could be simplified because of the court's expertise in evaluating legal services." ( Id. at pp. 819-820.) "If however, the matter is to be presented to the jury, the court should instruct along the following lines: 'If you find: (1) that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on his cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) that because of such breach it was reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to employ the services of an attorney to collect the benefits due under the Policy, then and only then is the plaintiff entitled to an award for attorney's fees incurred to obtain the Policy benefits, which award must not include attorney's fees incurred to recover any other portion of the verdict.' " ( Id. at p. 820.)