Burg v. Municipal Court

In Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 the defendant was charged with violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), which prohibited driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10 percent or more. (Burg, at pp. 261, 264.) He contended the statute was void for vagueness because it failed to give adequate notice of the conduct it prohibited. (Id. at pp. 261, 268-271.) In particular, he urged that the statute was invalid because it was "impossible for ordinary persons actually to know when their blood alcohol reaches the proscribed point." (Id. at p. 270.) Burg first concluded that the 0.10 percent blood-alcohol standard "could not be more precise as a standard for law enforcement," and thus assured the law would not be enforced arbitrarily. (Burg v. Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 270.) The court likewise rejected the defendant's argument that the statute failed to give fair notice of what conduct was prohibited. The court observed, "the real thrust of defendant's argument is that the statute is in effect 'void for preciseness.' His complaint is not that the language of the statute is vague or ambiguous, but that it is too exact. His novel theory is that the statute fails to notify potential violators of the condition it proscribes, because it is impossible for a person to determine by means of his senses whether his blood-alcohol level is a 'legal' 0.09 percent or an 'illegal' 0.10 percent." (Ibid.) Burg concluded that while this observation was true, it did not affect the statute's constitutionality. "Defendant's theory would render the void-for-vagueness doctrine internally inconsistent: the notice requirement would compete with the need to provide precise standards for law enforcement. When ... a statutory standard requires scientific measurement, the very factor that assures due process under the 'standards' component would violate due process under the 'notice' component." (Ibid.) The "very fact that he has consumed a quantity of alcohol should notify a person of ordinary intelligence that he is in jeopardy of violating the statute." (Burg, at p. 271.) The court expressed skepticism that any person driving a vehicle after drinking would be "unaware of the possibility that his or her blood-alcohol level might equal or exceed the statutory standard." (Ibid.) In Burg v. Municipal Court, the court discussed the predecessor version of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), for the then-new offense of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or more. Burg rejected defendant's claim that the statutory language created a conclusive presumption of intoxication and reduced the prosecution's burden of proof. "The statute does not create a conclusive presumption of intoxication .... Instead, the statute defines, in precise terms, the conduct proscribed. In other states that have enacted a statute similar to section 23152, subdivision (b), the courts have drawn the same conclusion, notably the Washington Supreme Court which declared, 'The statute does not presume, it defines.' " (Burg v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 265.)