Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court

In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 1 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248, 954 P.2d 511, the court specifically held "that there is no tort remedy for the intentional spoliation of evidence by a party to the cause of action to which the spoliated evidence is relevant, in cases in which, as here, the spoliation victim knows or should have known of the alleged spoliation before the trial or other decision on the merits of the underlying action." ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal. 4th at pp. 17-18, fn. omitted.) While the court acknowledged "that the intentional destruction of evidence should be condemned" ( id. at p. 8), it refused to create a tort remedy for such destruction. The court's decision was based on its conclusion that nontort remedies existed to rectify the intentional destruction of evidence by a party. These remedies included permitting the trier of fact to draw an unfavorable evidentiary inference against the party who destroyed the evidence (Evid. Code, 413; BAJI No. 2.03); issue, evidentiary, terminating and monetary sanctions for destroying evidence that should have been produced during discovery (Code Civ. Proc., 2023); State Bar disciplinary proceedings against any lawyer participating in the spoliation of evidence; and criminal penalties (Pen. Code, 135). The court's disinclination to create a tort remedy for spoliating evidence was also based, in part, on the "uncertainty of the fact of harm in spoliation cases." ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal. 4th at p. 13.) In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 954 P.2d 511, our Supreme Court held that a tort action may not be brought against a party for intentional spoliation of evidence where the spoliation is discovered before trial. The court stated that nontort remedies are available such as discovery sanctions or an instruction permitting the jury to draw the inference that the party spoliated the evidence to prevent its presentation at trial. ( Id., at p. 17; see also Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464, 474-475, 976 P.2d 223 no tort cause of action for intentional spoliation by third party; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404 no tort cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.) The sanctions are discretionary and can "include monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions, issue sanctions ordering that designated facts be taken as established or precluding the offending party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, evidence sanctions prohibiting the offending party from introducing designated matters into evidence, and terminating sanctions that include striking part or all of the pleadings, dismissing part or all of the action, or granting a default judgment against the offending party." ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 12.) In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 11, our Supreme Court held that sanctions are "to punish and deter the intentional spoliation of evidence." We reject the argument that the negligent spoliation of evidence requires an evidentiary sanction in every case. If the law were otherwise, spoliation of evidence sanctions could be used to bootstrap a negligence claim to strict liability whenever the defendant moved and stored evidence for safekeeping. In words of the trial court, "it's tantamount to entering a default judgment against the defendant . . . ."