In Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (Kern High School Dist.) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, the Commission decided that two statutes requiring school site councils and advisory committees for certain educational programs to provide notice of meetings and to post agendas for those meetings constituted a reimbursable state mandate under article XIII B, section 6. The Supreme Court held that the statutes do not constitute a reimbursable state mandate, as districts were neither legally compelled nor as a practical matter compelled to participate in the programs. (30 Cal.4th at pp. 745, 754.) In Kern High School Dist., the Department of Finance asserted in its brief that based upon the language of article XIII B, section 6, and on the City of Merced, "a reimbursable state mandate arises only if a local entity is 'required' or 'commanded'--that is, legally compelled--to participate in a program (or to provide a service) that, in turn, leads unavoidably to increasing the costs incurred by the entity." (Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741.) The Supreme Court said: "The core point articulated by the court in City of Merced is that activities undertaken at the option or discretion of a local government entity (that is, actions undertaken without any legal compulsion or threat of penalty for nonparticipation) do not trigger a state mandate ... ." (Id. at p. 742.) The high court decided that, with one possible exception, the programs in issue were not legally compelled and that the possible exception was not a mandate because the state supplied sufficient funding to cover the additional costs. (Id. at pp. 743-748.) The reimbursable mandate proponents argued that the legal compulsion standard was too narrow and that they should also be reimbursed because they had been compelled "as a practical matter" to participate in the programs. (Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 731.) The Supreme Court summarized its response to that claim as follows: "Although we do not foreclose the possibility that a reimbursable state mandate might be found in circumstances short of legal compulsion--for example, if the state were to impose a substantial penalty (independent of the program funds at issue) upon any local entity that declined to participate in a given program--claimants here faced no such practical compulsion. Instead, although claimants argue that they have had 'no true option or choice' other than to participate in the underlying funded educational programs, the asserted compulsion in this case stems only from the circumstance that claimants have found the benefits of various funded programs 'too good to refuse'--even though, as a condition of program participation, they have been forced to incur some costs. On the facts presented, the cost of compliance with conditions of participation in these funded programs does not amount to a reimbursable state mandate." (Ibid.) "In sum, the circumstances presented in the case before us do not constitute the type of nonlegal compulsion that reasonably could constitute, in claimants' phrasing, a 'de facto' reimbursable state mandate. Contrary to the situation that we described in City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522, a claimant that elects to discontinue participation in one of the programs here at issue does not face 'certain and severe ... penalties' such as 'double ... taxation' or other 'draconian' consequences (id., at p. 74), but simply must adjust to the withdrawal of grant money along with the lifting of program obligations. Such circumstances do not constitute a reimbursable state mandate for purposes of article XIII B, section 6." (Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 754.)